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Abstract
We incorporate wealth heterogeneity and the minimum investment requirements
in the model of Matsuyama (2004, Econometrica) and provide a complete charac-
terization of symmetry breaking. In particular, we identify the extensive margin
of investment as a key channel through which the interest rate may respond pos-
itively to capital accumulation, or equivalently, the interest rate can be higher in
the rich than in the poor countries. Then, financial market globalization may lead
to “uphill” capital flows from the poor to the rich countries, which widens the
initial cross-country income gap and leads to income divergence among inherently
identical countries, a phenomenon that Matsuyama calls symmetry breaking.
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1 Introduction
Matsuyama (2004) shows that, in the presence of fixed investment requirements (FIR,
hereafter) and financial frictions, countries which are inherently identical except for the
initial income converge to the same, unique, and stable steady state under international
financial autarky (IFA, hereafter), while financial market globalization (FMG, hereafter)
may lead to “symmetry breaking”, i.e., the initially rich (poor) countries may converge to
a new steady state with the income higher (lower) than that under IFA. He mentions in
subsection 7.1 and 7.2 that symmetry breaking may also arise in the presence of wealth
inequality and the minimum investment requirements (MIR, hereafter), while a complete
characterization of multiple steady states is “hopelessly complicated”.
In this paper, we formally prove Matsuyama’s conjecture by providing a complete,
analytical characterization of symmetry breaking in a generalized model with wealth
heterogeneity and MIR. Meanwhile, we show that, given financial frictions and MIR (or
FIR), the extensive margin of investment1 becomes a key channel through which the
interest rate may respond positively to capital accumulation under IFA, or equivalently,
the interest rate can be higher in the rich than in the poor countries under IFA. Thus,
FMG may lead to “uphill” capital flows from the poor to the rich countries, which widens
the cross-country income gap and leads to symmetry breaking.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose that the world economy consists of a continuum
of countries which only differ in the initial income. In each country, some agents have
both the technology and the funds for investment, and they are called entrepreneurs;
without either the technology or the funds, others have to lend out their net wealth
and are called households. If the interest rate is below the marginal rate of return to
investment, entrepreneurs prefer to finance the investment projects with external funds.
However, they are subject to borrowing constraints and have to put the own funds in the
project. The higher the entrepreneurial net wealth, the more they can borrow and invest.
Under IFA, all countries converge to the same, unique steady state, if the production
function has the decreasing marginal product of capital (MPK, hereafter). Along the
convergence path, capital accumulation raises the individuals’ income and net wealth,
which affects the credit market and the interest rate.
In the absence of FIR, the higher the individual’s net wealth, the more each en-
trepreneur (household) borrows (lends). This way, capital accumulation affects the credit
market only on the intensive margin. Meanwhile, the higher aggregate investment re-
duces the marginal rate of return to investment, which is called the neoclassical effect. It
reduces the entrepreneurial pledgeable value per unit of investment and dampens the ex-
pansion of their credit demand. Thus, the rise in the credit demand is dominated by that
in the credit supply so that the interest rate responds negatively to capital accumulation,
or equivalently, the interest rate is lower in the rich than in the poor country under IFA.
Under FMG, financial capital flows are “downhill” from the rich to the poor, narrowing
1Aggregate investment depends on the investment size of individual investors (the intensive margin)
as well as the mass of investors (the extensive margin).
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the cross-country income gap and inducing countries with different initial incomes to
converge to the same steady state. Thus, FMG does not lead to symmetry breaking.
In the presence of FIR, the individual’s investment project has the positive output
if it reaches a fixed size. The higher individual’s net wealth not only reduces (raises)
the individual entrepreneur’s (household’s) credit demand (supply) but also allows more
agents to become entrepreneurs with leveraged investment. This way, capital accumula-
tion affects the credit market on the intensive and extensive margins. In particular, the
aggregate credit demand declines (rises) while the aggregate credit supply rises (declines)
on the intensive (extensive) margin. On the credit demand side, the overall expansion
in the aggregate credit demand is identical as in the absence of the FIR. On the credit
supply side, the intensive-margin effect is the same as in the absence of the FIR, while
the extensive-margin effect is new. If the supply-side extensive-margin effect dominates
the demand-side neoclassical effect, the rise in the credit supply is dominated by that in
the credit demand so that the interest rate responds positively to capital accumulation,
or equivalently, the interest rate is higher in the rich than in the poor country under
IFA. Under FMG, financial capital flows are “uphill” from the poor to the rich, widening
the cross-country income gap and inducing countries with the different initial incomes to
converge to the different steady states. Thus, FMG leads to symmetry breaking.
To sum up, due to financial frictions and FIR, the interest rate may respond positively
to capital accumulation through the extensive-margin channel, which then causes the
“uphill” financial capital flows and symmetry breaking. This mechanism is also at work
in the presence of the MIR. Matsuyama (2005, 2007, 2008, 2012, 2013), Kikuchi (2008),
Kikuchi and Stachurski (2009), apply the mechanism of symmetry breaking to the issues
on credit traps, credit cycles, endogenous fluctuations, inequality, and other implications
of credit market imperfections. However, it is not quite clear how to empirically test the
theoretical conditions that support this mechanism in these papers. Here, we propose an
empirically testable hypothesis, i.e., symmetry breaking is more likely if the real interest
rate responses to income changes is positive and sufficiently large. A comprehensive
empirical investigation is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the model with
financial frictions and MIR. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the allocation under IFA and under
FMG, respectively. Section 5 concludes with some final remarks. The appendix compares
the results in the models with and without FIR as well as provides the technical proofs.
2 The Model
The world economy consists of a continuum of countries, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Countries
are inherently identical except for the initial income level. In each country, a continuum
of agents indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] are born every period and live for two periods, young and
old; the population size of each generation is constant at one; agents have the labor en-
dowment when young and consume when old; agent j is endowed with lj =
θ+1
θ
1
j
units of
labor, where j ∈ (1,∞) follows the Pareto distribution with the cumulative distribution
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function G(j) = 1− −θj and θ > 1. Agents supply the labor endowment inelastically to
the market and the aggregate labor supply is constant at L =
∫∞
1
ljdG(j) = 1.
A final good is internationally tradable and chosen as the numeraire. The final good
can be consumed or used to produce capital goods, which becomes available in the next
period. Capital goods are non-tradable and can be combined with labor to produce final
goods contemporaneously. Capital fully depreciates after the production. The markets
for final goods, capital goods, and labor are perfectly competitive. Thus, the productive
factors are rewarded with their respective marginal products. There is no uncertainty in
the model economy. Y it denotes aggregate output of final goods, L = 1 and K
i
t denote
the aggregate inputs of labor and capital goods, wit and q
i
t denote the wage rate and the
price of capital goods in country i and period t. To sum up,
Y it =
(
Kit
α
)α(
L
1− α
)1−α
, where α ∈ (0, 1), (1)
qitK
i
t = αY
i
t and w
i
tL = (1− α)Y it . (2)
Each agent is endowed with one project to produce capital goods subject to the MIR.
Consider agent j born in country i and period t. As shown in the left panel of figure
1, the agent can invest mij,t units of final goods in period t and produce k
i
j,t+1 = Rm
i
j,t
units of capital goods in period t+ 1, if its investment size is no less than a specific value,
mij,t ≥ mit; otherwise, the output is zero.2 The MIR has the function formmit = m(Y it )1−σ
with m > 0. As shown in the right panel of figure 1, the MIR is constant at m for σ = 1,
and it is linear in aggregate income for σ = 0. This function form allows for the possibility
that the MIR may differ in the rich and in the poor country.3
Agents can save the labor income nij,t = w
i
tlj either by producing capital goods at the
marginal rate of return qit+1R or lending to the market at the gross interest rate r
i
t. The
interest rate cannot exceed the marginal rate of return rit ≤ qit+1R; otherwise, nobody
would produce capital goods. Matsuyama (2004) calls it the profitability constraints.
Let us start with the case of rit < q
i
t+1R. If agent j can meet the MIR, it prefers to
finance its investment, mij,t, with loans. However, due to limited commitment, it can only
borrow up to a fraction λ of its investment return in the present value and has to use its
own funds as equity capital to cover the gap,
bij,t ≤ λ
qit+1Rm
i
j,t
rit
, and mij,t − bij,t ≤ nij,t, (3)
where λ ∈ (0, 1) reflects the level of financial development.4 Let ψij,t ≡
mij,t−bij,t
mij,t
denote the
agent’s equity-investment ratio. In period t+ 1, it gets the investment return, qit+1Rm
i
j,t,
2Despite the nonconvex individual production set, Matsuyama (2007, 2008) argues that assuming a
continuum of agents convexifies the aggregate production set.
3We assume the dependence of the MIR on aggregate income purely for the analytical purpose. As
shown in section 3, for σ = 0, capital accumulation does not affect the mass of investors and hence, the
aggregate investment responds only on the intensive margin; for σ = 1, capital accumulation affects the
mass of investors and hence, aggregate investment responds on the intensive and extensive margins. By
comparing the results in the two settings, we can highlight the role of the extensive-margin channel.
4Matsuyama (2008) shows that the strategic default a la` Hart and Moore (1994) can give rise to this
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Figure 1: Individual Investment Project, MIR, and Aggregate Income
repays the debt, ritb
i
j,t, and consumes the rest. The equity rate is defined as the rate of
return to its equity capital, Ωij,t ≡
qit+1Rm
i
j,t−ritbij,t
mij,t−bij,t
. Use the borrowing constraint (3) to get,
ψij,t ≥ 1− λ
qit+1R
rit
, (4)
Ωij,t = q
i
t+1R + (q
i
t+1R− rit)(
1
ψij,t
− 1). (5)
The leverage effect (qit+1R−rit)( 1ψij,t −1) depends positively on the spread (q
i
t+1R−rit) and
the debt-equity ratio ( 1
ψij,t
−1). Given the positive spread qit+1R > rit, the agent maximizes
the leverage effect by borrowing to the limit. Thus, the equality sign holds for (4) and
ψij,t is independent of agent-j’s net wealth. The positive leverage effect, Ω
i
t > q
i
t+1R > r
i
t,
induces the agent to invest its entire labor income as equity capital, mij,t − bij,t = nij,t.
If rit = q
i
t+1R, the leverage effect vanishes. Then, the agent does not borrow to the
limit or invest its entire labor income, i.e., mij,t and ψ
i
j,t are indeterminate. To sum up,
ψij,t
= ψit ≡ 1− λ
qit+1R
rit
, wealth-independent if rit < q
i
t+1R;
≥ 1− λ qit+1R
rit
, indeterminate, if rit = q
i
t+1R;
(6)
Ωij,t = Ω
i
t =
qit+1R + (qit+1R− rit)( 1ψit − 1) > qit+1R, if rit < qit+1R;qit+1R, if rit = qit+1R; (7)
mij,t
=
nij,t
ψit
=
wit
ψit
θ+1
θj
, and
∂mij,t
∂j
< 0, if rit < q
i
t+1R;
≤ nij,t
ψit
, indeterminate, if rit = q
i
t+1R.
(8)
If rit < q
i
t+1R, there exists a cutoff value 
i
t. The agents with j ∈ (1, it] can meet the
MIR, mij,t =
wit
ψit
θ+1
θj
≥ mit, and are called entrepreneurs. Their total mass is τ it = 1−(it)−θ.
form of the borrowing constraints.
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The cutoff value is determined by the marginal entrepreneur with j = 
i
t and m
i
j,t = m
i
t,
wit
ψit
1 + θ
θit
= m(Y it )
1−σ, ⇒ it =
(wit)
σ
ψitF
, where F ≡ θm
(1− α)1−σ(θ + 1) . (9)
When young, entrepreneurs use the entire labor income, nij,t, and the loan b
i
j,t = n
i
j,t(
1
ψit
−1)
to finance their investment; when old, they consume, ci,ej,t+1, and exit from the economy,
nij,t = w
i
tlj and c
i,e
j,t+1 = n
i
j,tΩ
i
t. (10)
The agents with j > 
i
t cannot meet the MIR and are called households. Their total
mass is 1 − τ it = (it)−θ. When young, households lend out the entire labor income nij,t;
when old, they consume, ci,hj,t+1, and exit from the economy,
nij,t = w
i
tlj and c
i,h
j,t+1 = n
i
j,tr
i
t. (11)
We analyze the economic allocation under two scenarios: (1) IFA where agents are
allowed to borrow or lend domestically, (2) FMG where agents are allowed to borrow or
lend domestically as well as internationally.5
Let M it , D
i
t, and S
i
t denote the aggregate investment, the aggregate credit demand
and supply. Under IFA, the markets for capital goods and credit clear domestically,6
Kit+1 =
∫ it
1
Rmij,tdG(j) = RM
i
t , where M
i
t ≡
∫ it
1
mij,tdG(j), (12)
Dit ≡
∫ it
1
(mij,t − nij,t)dG(j), Sit ≡
∫ ∞
it
nij,tdG(j), D
i
t = S
i
t , ⇒ M it = wit. (13)
If rit = q
i
t+1R, the agents who can meet the MIR may not invest their entire labor
income or borrow to the limit. Despite the indeterminate individual investment size,
aggregate saving is fully invested into capital goods in equilibrium, Kit+1 = RM
i
t = Rw
i
t.
Definition 1. Under IFA, a market equilibrium in country i is a set of allocations
of agents, {nij,t,mij,t, ci,ej,t, ci,hj,t , ψij,t}, and aggregate variables, {Y it , Kit ,M it , qit, wit, rit,Ωit, it},
satisfying equations (1)-(2), (6)-(13).
Under FMG, let φit denote the ratio of capital outflows over domestic saving in country
i, with negative values indicating the case of capital inflows. The equilibrium conditions
are identical as under IFA except for the domestic and world credit market conditions.
M it = w
i
t(1− φit), (14)∫ 1
0
witφ
i
tdi = 0. (15)
Definition 2. Under FMG a market equilibrium in country i is a set of allocations
of agents, {nij,t,mij,t, ci,ej,t, ci,hj,t , ψij,t}, and aggregate variables, {Y it , Kit ,M it , qit, wit,Ωit, it, φit},
satisfying equations (1)-(2), (6)-(12), (14), the interest rate is equalized across countries
rit = r
∗
t , and the world interest rate r
∗
t is determined by equation (15).
5Following Matsuyama (2004), we exclude FDI flows by assumption. von Hagen and Zhang (2014a,b)
analyze the joint determination of financial capital flows and FDI flows.
6According to the Walras’ law, the market for final goods clears in equilibrium.
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3 Equilibrium Allocation Under IFA
Without loss of generality, we suppress the country index i for the scenario of IFA. Let
XA denote the steady-state value of variable Xt under IFA. Given the fixed aggregate
labor input L = 1, equation (2) implies that wt = (1− α)Yt. Thus, we can use the wage
as a proxy for aggregate income in the following analysis.
Combine equation (12)-(13) to get Kt+1 = Rwt and the law of motion for wage
7 is
wt+1 =
(1− α)
L
Yt+1 =
(
Rwt
ρ
)α
, (16)
which is concave and crosses the 45◦ line once and only one from left with wA =
(
R
ρ
)ρ
.
Proposition 1. Under IFA, there exists a unique, stable steady state in each country.
As a collection of autarkic countries, the world economy has a unique, stable steady
state under IFA which is symmetric in the sense that, independent of the initial income,
all countries end up in the long run with the same income at YA =
wA
1−α .
Although financial frictions and the MIR do not affect the dynamics and the steady
state under IFA, they may fundamentally change the dynamic stability of the world
economy under FMG. In the following, we analyze the interest rate response to capital
accumulation under IFA, which is critical for us to understand the consequences of FMG.
Interest Rate Response to Capital Accumulation
Iff rt < qt+1R, the borrowing constraints are strictly binding and the interest rate is a
function of wt defined by equations (17)-(18).
8
rt =
λ
1− ψt qt+1R =
λ
1− ψtw
−(1−α)
t R
αρ1−α (17)
ψt
(1− ψt) 11+θ
=
wσt
F
. (18)
Iff rt = qt+1R, the borrowing constraints are slack and the interest rate is,
rt = qt+1R = w
−(1−α)
t R
αρ1−α. (19)
As mentioned in section 2, the zero spread rt = qt+1R leads to the indeterminate mj,t and
ψj,t. For analytical simplicity, we focus on an equilibrium where all entrepreneurs still
invest their entire labor income and choose the same ψt determined by equation (18).
Define Λ ≡ λ
1
1+θ
1−λ (1− α)(1 + 1θ ) as a function of λ ∈ (0, 1) and ∂Λ∂λ > 0.
Lemma 1. Iff ψt ∈ (1 − λ, 1) or equivalently m ≤ Y σt Λ, the borrowing constraints are
slack; iff ψt ∈ (0, 1− λ] or equivalently m ≥ Y σt Λ, the borrowing constraints are binding.
7Using the law of motion for wage simplifies our dynamic and steady-state analysis. Alternatively,
one can also use the law of motion for capital, but the analysis of FMG becomes more complicated.
8See the proof of lemma 1 in appendix B for derivation.
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If the borrowing constraints are slack, the interest rate declines in aggregate income,
due to the neoclassical effect (the decreasing MPK).
ln rt = ln qt+1R︸ ︷︷ ︸
neoclassical effect
= −(1− α) lnwt + lnRαρ1−α, and ∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
= −(1− α) < 0. (20)
If the borrowing constraints are binding, the interest rate may rise in aggregate income.
We identify the relevant condition by analyzing the credit market equilibrium.
Use equations (3) and (13) to rewrite the aggregate credit demand and supply as
Dt =
λqt+1R
rt
Mt =
λqt+1R
rt
wt and St = wt
−(1+θ)
t , which are affected by various factors,
lnDt = lnwt︸︷︷︸
net-wealth effect
+ ln qt+1R︸ ︷︷ ︸
neoclassical effect
+ lnλ︸︷︷︸
financial-development effect
− ln rt︸︷︷︸
interest-rate effect
(21)
lnSt = lnwt − (1 + θ) ln t = lnwt︸︷︷︸
net-wealth effect
+
(
1 +
1
θ
)
ln(1− τt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
supply-side extensive-margin effect
. (22)
According to equation (21), a rise in the interest rate reduces the present value of the
entrepreneurs’ pledgeable investment return so that the credit demand curve is downward
sloping, ∂Dt
∂rt
< 0; according to equation (22), since households supply their labor income
inelastically to the credit market, the credit supply curve is vertical ∂St
∂rt
= 0. Besides, the
aggregate credit demand and supply are affected by the following factors.
• The net-wealth effect: the higher the aggregate income, the higher the agents’ labor
income and net wealth, the higher the aggregate credit demand and supply.
• The neoclassical effect: the higher the aggregate investment in period t, the lower
the MPK in period t+ 1, the lower the period-t pledgeable value of the individual
entrepreneur’s investment return, the lower the credit demand.
• The financial-development effect: the higher the level of financial development, the
more the individual entrepreneur can borrow, the higher the credit demand.
• The supply-side extensive-margin effect: the larger the mass of households 1 − τt,
the higher the aggregate credit supply.
Figure 2 shows the credit market equilibrium under IFA. The downward-sloping credit
demand curve Dt and the vertical credit supply curve St cross at point E with the
equilibrium interest rate at rt. If aggregate income rises marginally from Yt to Y˜t, the
aggregate saving rises proportionally from wt = (1− α)Yt to w˜t = (1− α)Y˜t.
Combine equations (9) and (13) to get
t[1− (t)−(1+θ)] =
wσt
F
, ⇒ sgn
(
∂t
∂wt
)
= sgn(σ). (23)
For σ = 0, higher Yt raises the MIR mt = mYt and the individual’s net wealth
nj,t = ljwt = lj(1− α)Yt in the equal proportions. Thus, according to equation (23), the
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Figure 2: The Credit Market Response to An Increase in Aggregate Income
cutoff value is constant at t = A and so is the mass of entrepreneurs τt = τA = 1− −θA .
Then, the higher individual’s net wealth affects the aggregate credit demand and supply
only on the intensive margin. According to equations (21) and (22), the net-wealth
effect raises the credit supply and demand in the equal proportions, while the neoclassical
effect reduces the credit demand. Let ∆ lnXt ≡ ln X˜t−lnXt denote the percentage change
in variable Xt. Combining equations (21) and (22), the net-wealth effect cancels out and
the interest rate is driven by the neoclassical effect on the credit-demand side,
∆ lnDt = ∆ lnwt + ∆ ln qt+1R−∆ ln rt, ∆ lnSt = ∆ lnwt,
∆ lnDt = ∆ lnSt, ⇒, ∆ ln rt = ∆ ln qt+1R︸ ︷︷ ︸
the neoclassical effect (-)
. (24)
As shown in the left panel of figure 2, the rightward shift of the credit demand curve is
dominated by that of the credit supply curve. Then, the credit market equilibrium moves
from point E to E˜ with a lower interest rate r˜t < rt.
For σ = 1, the MIR is constant at mt = m and the higher individual’s net wealth
allows more agents to meet the MIR and invest as entrepreneurs, i.e.,
∂t
∂Yt
> 0 and ∂τt
∂Yt
> 0,
according to equation (23). Then, the aggregate credit demand and supply respond on
the intensive and the extensive margins. In particular, the decline in the mass of
households reduces the credit supply on the extensive margin. Combining equations (21)
and (22), the interest rate is affected by two factors,
∆ ln rt = ∆ ln qt+1R︸ ︷︷ ︸
neoclassical effect (-)
− ∆
(
1 +
1
θ
)
ln(1− τt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
supply-side extensive-margin effect (-)
. (25)
If the supply-side extensive-margin effect dominates the demand-side neoclassical effect,
the rightward shift of the credit supply curve is dominated by that of the credit demand
curve. In this case, the credit market equilibrium moves from point E to E˜ with a higher
interest rate, r˜t > rt, as shown in the right panel of figure 2.
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Lemma 2. For σ = 1, ψt rises in Yt under IFA. Given λ ∈ (0, λ˜A), the interest rate rises
in aggregate income, if ψt ∈ (ψ˜A, 1− λ), where ψ˜A ≡ 12−α
1−α− 11+θ
and λ˜A ≡ 1− ψ˜A.
For σ = 0, the interest rate strictly declines in aggregate income under IFA.
 









Figure 3: Interest Rate Patterns in the {λ, ψt} Space under IFA
Figure 3 shows the interest rate pattern in the {λ, ψt} space under IFA. According to
lemma 1, for (λ, ψt) in region SD, the borrowing constraints are s lack and the interest
rate, which coincides with the social rate of return, declines in aggregate income, due
to the neoclassical effect; for (λ, ψt) in region BI (BD), the borrowing constraints are
binding and the interest rate increases (declines) in aggregate income, as the supply-side
extensive-margin effect dominates (is dominated by) the neoclassical effect.
wA
wtO
S wt+1
Phase Diagram of Wages
wA
wtO
rt
qt+1R
The Rates of Return (σ=0)
wA
wtO
rt(ψh)
rt(ψm)
rt(ψl)
qt+1R
The Rates of Return (σ=1)
Figure 4: Dynamics of Wage and Interest Rate under IFA
Figure 4 shows proposition 1 and lemma 2 graphically. In the left panel, the law
of motion for wage is concave and crosses the 45◦ line once and only once from the
left at point S with the steady-state wage wA. Thus, financial frictions and the MIR
do not affect the uniqueness and stability of the steady state under IFA. In the middle
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panel, for σ = 0, the interest rate, which is proportional to the marginal rate of return to
investment, declines in wt, due to the neoclassical effect. In the right panel, for σ = 1 and
λ ∈ (0, λ˜A), the interest rate is a non-monotonic function of wt, due to the interactions
of the supply-side extensive-margin effect and the neoclassical effect.
Consider the interest rate response to wit around the steady state. Let Z ≡ Rρ
(
1+θ
θm
) 1
ρ .
Combine equations (16) and (18) to get ψA as a function of the parameters {R,m, ρ, θ},
ψA
(1− ψA) 11+θ
=
wA
F
=
(
R
ρ
)ρ
1 + θ
θm
= Zρ. (26)
If the parameter configuration makes ψA = ψ
h ∈ (1− λ, 1) or ψA = ψl ∈ (0, ψ˜A), i.e., in
region SD or BD of figure 3, the interest rate declines in wt around the steady state; if
the parameter configuration makes ψA = ψ
m ∈ (ψ˜F , 1− λ), i.e., in region BI of figure 3,
the interest rate rises in wt around the steady state. See the right panel of figure 4.
As shown in section 4, the positive interest rate response to capital accumulation
under IFA is key to Matsuyama’s symmetry breaking result.9
4 Equilibrium Allocation Under FMG
From period t = 0 on, agents in country i are allowed to borrow or lend abroad. As a
small open economy, country i takes the world interest rate as given rit = r
∗. Without
loss of generality, we assume that r∗ = rA, where rA = λ1−ψAρ (rA = ρ) if the borrowing
constraints are binding (slack) in the autarkic steady state. In this case, the autarkic
steady state is still a steady state under FMG, but it may not be stable or unique.
Under FMG, there exists a threshold value w¯F such that, given r
i
t = r
∗, for wit ∈
(0, w¯F ), the borrowing constraints are binding, ψ
i
t ∈ (0, 1−λ), and the aggregate dynamics
of country i are characterized by {wit, ψit, it} satisfying equations (9), (27)-(28),10
wit+1 =
[
R
ρ
wit
1− (it)−(1+θ)
ψit
]α
, (27)
rit =
λ
1− ψit
qit+1R =
λ
1− ψit
(wit+1)
− 1
ρR = r∗. (28)
For wit > w¯F , the borrowing constraints are slack and the law of motion for wage is flat
at wit+1 =
(
R
r∗
)ρ
. One can solve for w¯F by putting ψ
i
t = 1− λ in equations (9), (27)-(28).
Consider first the case of σ = 0. Suppose that country i is below the autarkic steady
state in period t = 0, i.e., Y i0 < YA. If it were still under IFA in period t = 0, the interest
rate would be higher than the world interest rate, rit > rA = r
∗, according to lemma
2. FMG leads to capital inflows to country i in period t = 0, which raises its domestic
9As long as the aggregate production function has the decreasing MPK, i.e., f ′(k) > 0 and f ′′(k) < 0,
where k ≡ KL , the neoclassical effect and the supply-side extensive margin effect exist in the presence of
the MIR and financial frictions. Thus, our assumption of the Cobb-Douglas production function is not
essential for the positive interest rate response to capital accumulation.
10See the proof of Proposition 2 in appendix B for the derivation.
11









B











S

Figure 5: Phase Diagrams of Wages under FMG versus under IFA: σ = 0
investment. By the same logic, if Y i0 > YA, FMG leads to capital outflows from country
i, which reduces its domestic investment. In both circumstances, capital flows make the
law of motion for wage flatter around the autarkic steady state than under IFA, which
speeds up the convergence. The solid (dashed) curve in figure 5 shows the law of motion
for wage under FMG and under IFA, respectively. The left (right) panel shows the case
where the borrowing constraints are binding (slack) in the autarkic steady state.
Proposition 2. For σ = 0, the autarkic steady state is still the unique, stable steady
state under FMG. For σ = 1, FMG may lead to multiple steady states if λ ∈ (0, λˆF ),
where λˆF ≡
α+ 1−α
1+θ
+
√
(2−α− 1−α
1+θ
)2−4(1−α)
2
.
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Figure 6: Parameter Configuration for Symmetry Breaking under FMG: σ = 1
Consider the case of σ = 1. Figure 6 shows the parameter configuration for multiple
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steady states under FMG in the (λ, ψA) space and in the {λ, Z} space, respectively.11
The dashed line in the left panel shows the threshold value ψ˜A defined in lemma 2. The
solid (dash) curves in figure 7 show the laws of motion for wage under FMG (IFA), with
the parameter configuration in the five regions of figure 6, respectively.
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Figure 7: Phase Diagrams of Wage under FMG versus under IFA: σ = 1
Consider the parameter configuration in region B of figure 6. As shown in the upper-
left panel of figure 7, if the country’s initial income is higher (lower) than in the autarkic
steady state wi0 > wA (w
i
0 < wA), it converge to a new stable steady state H (L) with
wiH > wA (w
i
L < wA) under FMG. The intuition is as follows.
11At first sight, it seems wrong to claim that the left panel shows the parameter configuration, because
ψA on the vertical axis is not a parameter. In fact, as the steady-state value of an endogenous variable,
ψA is defined by equation (26) as an implicit function of the parameters {R,m, ρ, θ} and reflects the
changes in these parameters. One can use equation (26) to map the diagram from the {λ, ψA} space
(the left panel) to the {λ, Z} space (the right panel). As both λ and ψA can be measured empirically,
the diagram in the {λ, ψA} space can be interpreted more meaningfully than in the {λ, Z} space.
Matsuyama (2004) normalizes the FIR at unity and shows in figure 5 the parameter configuration in
the {λ,R} space. Then, he analyzes the impact of the productivity, R, on symmetry breaking. In our
model, we introduce m as a free parameter for the MIR. Technically, it is R
ρ
m that matters for symmetry
breaking. If the combination of R and m gives the same value of Z, ψA does not change and neither
does the parameter configuration in the {λ, ψA} and {λ, Z} spaces. One can map the diagram from the
{λ, Z} space to the {λ,R} space or to the {λ,m} space to analyze the impacts of R or m.
According to appendix A and the proofs of propositions 2 and 4, the model with the FIR in Matsuyama
(2004) is a limiting case of our model with σ = 1 and θ →∞. In particular, figure 10 is a limiting case
of figure 6 with θ →∞.
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For the parameter configuration {λ, ψA} in region BI of figure 3, the interest rate
responds positively to capital accumulation in the steady state under IFA, which dampens
the expansion of the entrepreneurial borrowing capacity. By decoupling the interest rate
from the domestic credit market condition rit = r
∗, FMG eliminates this dampening effect
and allows more agents to meet the MIR and invest as entrepreneurs, which amplifies the
response of domestic investment on the extensive margin to capital accumulation. For
the parameter configuration in region B of figure 6, the FMG-driven amplification effect
dominates the neoclassical effect so that the slope of the law of motion for wage exceeds
unity and the autarkic steady state is unstable. Here, the positive interest rate response
to capital accumulation under IFA is key to the multiple steady states under FMG.
Starting from region B of figure 6, let us reduce m so that ψA rises
12 and the parameter
configuration moves upwards into region BC where the borrowing constraints are slack
in the autarkic steady state. The autarkic interest rate coincides with the marginal
rate of return to investment and declines in aggregate income, rit = q
i
t+1R, due to the
neoclassical effect. Given r∗ = rA = ρ, FMG makes the law of motion for wage flat at the
autarkic steady state with wit+1 =
(
R
r∗
)ρ
=
(
R
ρ
)ρ
= wA and hence, the autarkic steady
state is locally stable. However, for wit  wA, ψit enters into region BI of figure 3 where
the interest rate responds positively to income change. Then, FMG affects domestic
investment in the same way as in case B. The upper-right panel of figure 7 shows that,
besides the stable autarkic steady state S, there are another stable steady state L and an
unstable steady state M with wL < wM < wA.
Starting from region B of figure 6, let us raise m so that ψA declines and the pa-
rameter configuration moves downwards into region AB where the borrowing constraints
are binding in the autarkic steady state. In region AB, the interest rate response to in-
come change is slightly positive around the autarkic steady state. Thus, the FMG-driven
amplification effect is dominated by the neoclassical effect so that the autarkic steady
state is still stable. However, for wit  wA, ψit enters into region B of figure 6 where the
interest rate response to income change is strongly positive. Then, FMG affects domestic
investment in the same way as in case B. The upper-middle panel of figure 7 shows that,
besides the stable autarkic steady state S, there are another stable steady state H and
an unstable steady state M with wH > wM > wA.
For the parameter configuration in region A and C of figure 6, FMG does not generate
multiple steady states. See the lower panels of figure 7.
To sum up, although the initial income level does not matter for the economic dy-
namics and the steady state under IFA, it does matter under FMG. In case B, starting
with the income level slightly higher (lower) than that in the autarkic steady state, a
small open economy converges to a new, stable steady state with the income much higher
(lower) than in the autarkic steady state; in case AB (BC), starting with an income
sufficiently higher (lower) than that in the autarkic steady state, a small open economy
converges to a new, stable steady state with the income much higher (lower) than in the
12According to equation (26), ψA declines in m.
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autarkic steady state. This way, FMG amplifies the initial cross-country income gap.
Incorporate this mechanism into a world economy where countries are inherently
identical except for the initial income level. For the parameter configuration in region
B, the world economy has a unique, symmetric, stable steady state under IFA where
all countries have the same income in the long run, independent of the initial income
level; FMG inevitably destabilizes this symmetric, autarkic steady state and leads to the
asymmetric, stable steady state where the initially rich (poor) countries have the income
higher (lower) than in the autarkic steady state.
Comparison with Matsuyama (2004)
Matsuyama (2004) assumes that agents have the same labor endowment and the same in-
divisible investment project with the FIR. In the presence of financial frictions, aggregate
investment adjusts only on the extensive margin and the agents who can borrow and in-
vest are randomly determined by lottery. We extend Matsuyama’s model in two aspects.
First, we replace his assumption of the FIR with the MIR so that, in the presence of
financial frictions, aggregate investment adjusts on the intensive and the extensive mar-
gins; second, we introduce the heterogeneous labor endowment so that the individual’s
net wealth becomes the criterion for allocating the loans.
Matsuyama (2004) shows that in the case of symmetry breaking, the borrowing con-
straints must be slack in the rich country under FMG, and hence, the equity premium is
always zero there, Ωit− rit = 0. As shown in the proof of proposition 2, for σ = 1, the law
of motion for wage under FMG may consist of three subfunctions, i.e., a convex part, a
concave part and a flat part.13 Thus, in the case of symmetry breaking, the borrowing
constraints can be binding in the rich country under FMG, and hence, the equity pre-
mium can be positive Ωit − rit > 0, in the rich country, but smaller than that in the poor
country. Compare the upper panels of figure 7 with those in figure 11. Thus, one may
test the tightness of the borrowing constraints across countries by empirically estimating
the spread between the equity rate and the interest rate.
For m = 1 and σ = 1, the MIR is constant at one; for θ → ∞, the labor endowment
distribution degenerates into a unit mass at lj = 1 so that agents have the same labor
income. In this limiting case, our model is analytically identical as that of Matsuyama
(2004) and the right panel of figure 6 is the same as figure 5 of Matsuyama (2004).14
5 Final Remark
This paper highlights the extensive margin of investment as a key channel through which
the interest rate may respond positively to capital accumulation, given financial frictions
13One can prove that, if wit is in the flat part, the borrowing constraints are slack; otherwise, the
borrowing constraints are binding.
14For the comparison purpose, we replicate the results of Matsuyama (2004) in appendix A. Note that
figure 5 of Matsuyama (2004) has a technical error. See the appendix for further discussion.
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and the MIR. Then, FMG may lead to “uphill” capital flows from the poor to the rich
countries, which widens the initial cross-country income gap and leads to income diver-
gence. The model developed in this paper can be applied to other related issues where
even very small exogenous heterogeneities may lead to large heterogeneities in endoge-
nous variables. Zhang (2014) introduces the two-sector Heckscher-Ohlin feature into the
current setting and shows that trade integration may also lead to symmetry breaking
and affect the direction of financial capital flows. By decomposing the project investment
into the tangible and intangible parts, Zhang (2013a) shows that FMG may amplify the
cross-country differences in investment tangibility and productivity.
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Appendix
A FIR and Symmetry Breaking: Matsuyama (2004)
In this section, we replicate the results of Matsuyama (2004) and highlight the role of
the extensive-margin channel by comparing the settings with and without the FIR. We
also prove that the setting with the FIR is analytically a limiting case of the generalized
model with σ = 1 and θ →∞. See Zhang (2013b) for the more detailed analysis.
A.1 Model Settings with and without the FIR
The model setting differs from the generalized model in sector 2 only in two aspects:
• each agent has one unit of labor endowment, and
• the individual projects are subject to the FIR.
For the comparison purpose, we also introduce a model setting with no FIR.
In the first setting, a fraction τ ∈ (0, 1) of agents who are born in period t and country
i have the technology to convert mit units final goods in period t to k
i
t+1 = Rm
i
t units of
capital goods in period t+ 1, and they are called entrepreneurs. Without the technology,
other agents can only lend their labor income and are called households. The mass of
entrepreneurs τ is exogenous, while the individual investment size mit is endogenous.
Then, aggregate investment takes place on the intensive margin, Kit+1 = τRm
i
t. With no
investment size requirements, it is called setting N.
In the second setting, each agent is endowed with an indivisible project to transform
m units of final goods in period t into Rm units of capital goods in period t + 1.15 If
wit < m, an agent must borrow m − wit to start its project and the aggregate saving is
not sufficient to allow all agents to start the projects. According to Matsuyama (2004),
random credit rationing allows a fraction τ it ∈ (0, 1) of agents to get the loan m − wit to
start the projects and they are called entrepreneurs, while other agents can only lend the
labor income and they are called households. Different from setting N, the individual
investment size m is exogenous, while the mass of entrepreneurs τ it is endogenous.
16 Thus,
aggregate investment takes place only on the extensive margin, Kit+1 = τ
i
tRm. With f ixed
investment size requirements at the individual level, it is called setting F.
Figure 8 shows the individual investment function in the two settings. In setting N,
the individual project is linear, kit+1 = Rm
i
t. In setting F, the project output is zero for
the input mit ∈ [0,m) and it is constant at Rm for the input mit ≥ m. For simplicity,
we use τ it and m
i
t to denote the mass of entrepreneurs and the individual investment size
in the model description. Setting N is characterized by the fixed mass of entrepreneurs,
τ it = τ , while setting F is characterized by the fixed project size, m
i
t = m.
15Matsuyama (2004) implicitly normalizes the individual project size at m = 1, while we allow m to
be a free parameter and analyze its impacts on symmetry breaking.
16Although the FIR results in the non-convexity of the individual production set, Matsuyama (2007,
2008) argues that assuming a continuum of homogeneous agents convexifies the production set.
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Figure 8: Individual Projects in the Two Settings
Entrepreneurs are subject to the borrowing constraints (3). Since households are
homogeneous and so are entrepreneurs, we drop the subscript j.
Under IFA, the markets for capital goods and credit clear each period.
Kit+1 = τ
i
tRm
i
t, (29)
τ it (m
i
t − wit) = (1− τ it )wit. (30)
Definition 3. Under IFA, a market equilibrium in country i is a set of allocations
of agents, {mit, ci,et , ci,ht , ψit}, and aggregate variables, {Y it , Kit , qit, wit, rit,Ωit, τ it}, satisfying
equations (1)-(2), (6)-(8), (10)-(11), (29)-(30).
τ it = τ is exogenous in setting N, while m
i
t = m is exogenous in setting F.
Under FMG, the equilibrium conditions are identical as under IFA except for the
domestic and world credit market conditions.
τ it (m
i
t − wit) = (1− τ it )wit − φitwit, (31)∫ 1
0
witφ
i
tdi = 0. (32)
Definition 4. Under FMG, a market equilibrium in country i is a set of allocations
of agents, {mit, ci,et , ci,ht , ψit}, and aggregate variables, {Y it , Kit , qit, wit,Ωit, τ it , φit}, satisfying
equations (1)-(2), (6)-(8), (10)-(11), (29), and (31), and the interest rate is equalized
across countries rit = r
∗
t and the world interest rate r
∗
t is determined by equation (32).
τ it = τ is exogenous in setting N, while m
i
t = m is exogenous in setting F.
A.2 Equilibrium Allocation under IFA
For simplicity, we suppress the country index i for the scenario of IFA.
In setting N, according to equations (29) and (30), the equity-investment ratio is
constant at ψt =
wt
mt
= τ and domestic investment is fully financed by domestic saving
Kt+1 = Rτmt = Rwt. The law of motion for wage is characterized by equation (16).
In setting F, for wt < m, aggregate saving is too low to allow all agents to run
their projects. According to equations (29) and (30), the mass of entrepreneurs and the
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equity-investment ratio are endogenous, τt = ψt =
wt
m
< 1, and domestic investment is
fully financed by domestic saving Kt+1 = Rτtm = Rwt. Then, the law of motion for
wage is the same as in setting N. For wt ≥ m, all agents self-finance their projects,
τt = ψt = 1. Given the fixed project size, the aggregate output of capital goods is
constant at Kt+1 = Rm and the law of motion for wage is flat at wt+1 =
(
Rm
ρ
)α
.
Proposition 3. In setting N, ψt = τ ; in setting F, ψt = τt =
wt
m
.
In both settings, there exists a unique, stable steady state in each country under IFA;
iff ψt ∈ (0, 1− λ], the borrowing constraints are binding;
iff ψt ∈ (1− λ, 1], the borrowing constraints are slack.
Proposition 3 is essentially the same as proposition 1 and lemma 1.
Interest Rate Response to Capital Accumulation
If the borrowing constraints are slack, the interest rate is equal to the marginal rate of
return to investment and declines in aggregate income. See equation (20).
Let us then consider the case of the binding borrowing constraints.
In setting N, combine equations (6), (16), (29)-(30) to get
rt =
λ
1− ψt qt+1R =
λ
1− τ w
−(1−α)
t R
αρ1−α. (33)
Higher aggregate income raises the agents’ labor income. With the extensive margin
mute, entrepreneurs (households) to borrow (lend) more. Due to the neoclassical effect,
the interest rate declines in aggregate income, as in the generalized model with σ = 0.
In setting F, combine equations (6), (16), (29)-(30) to get
rt =
λ
1− ψt qt+1R =
λ
1− τtw
−(1−α)
t R
αρ1−α. (34)
Higher aggregate income raises the agents’ labor income, which allows more agents to
get the required loans and invest as entrepreneurs τt =
wt
m
. Then, the decline in the mass
of households (1 − τt) reduces the aggregate credit supply on the extensive margin. If
the supply-side extensive-margin effect dominates the neoclassical effect, the interest rate
rises in aggregate income, as in the generalized model with σ = 1.
Lemma 3. In setting N, the interest rate declines in aggregate income under IFA.
In setting F, ψt rises in Yt under IFA. Given λ ∈ (0, λ˜A), the interest rate rises in
aggregate income, if ψt ∈ (ψ˜A, 1− λ), where ψ˜A ≡ 1−α2−α and λ˜A ≡ 1− ψ˜A.
Lemma 3 is essentially the limiting case of lemma 2 with θ →∞.
Figure 9 shows the interest rate pattern in the {λ, ψt} space in setting F, which is the
limiting case of figure 3 with θ →∞. The analysis follows that in section 3.
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Figure 9: Interest Rate Patterns in the {λ, ψt} Space under IFA
A.3 Equilibrium Allocation under FMG
From period t = 0 on, agents in country i are allowed to borrow or lend abroad. As a
small open economy, country i takes the world interest rate as given rit = r
∗. Without
loss of generality, we assume that r∗ = rA, where rA = λ1−ψAρ (rA = ρ) if the borrowing
constraints are binding (slack) in the autarkic steady state, with ψA = τ (ψA =
wA
m
) in
setting N (F).
In setting N, given the negative interest rate response to income change under IFA,
FMG leads to financial capital inflows (outflows), if Y i0 < YA (Y
i
0 > YA), which dampens
the response of aggregate investment to income changes. The FMG-driven dampening
effect reinforces the neoclassical effect, which ensures the uniqueness and the stability of
the steady state under FMG, as in the generalized model with σ = 0.
In setting F, as the interest rate may respond positively to income change under IFA
and FMG may amplify the response of aggregate investment to income changes. If the
FMG-driven amplifying effect dominates the neoclassical effect, multiple steady states
may arise, as in the generalized model with σ = 1.
Proposition 4. Under FMG, the autarkic steady state is still the unique, stable steady
state in setting N, while multiple steady states may arise in setting F if λ ∈ (0, λˆF ),
where λˆF ≡ α.
Proposition 4 is essentially the limiting case of proposition 2 with θ →∞.
Define an auxiliary parameter Z ≡ R
ρ
(
1
m
) 1
ρ . Under IFA, the steady-state value of ψit
is a function of the parameters {R,m, ρ}
ψA =
wA
m
=
(
R
ρ
)ρ
1
m
= Zρ. (35)
Figure 10 shows the parameter configuration for multiple steady states under FMG in
the (λ, ψA) space and in the {λ, Z} space, respectively. The dashed line in the left panel
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shows the threshold value ψ˜A defined in lemma 3. As shown in the proof of propositions
2 and 4, figure 10 is the limiting case of figure 6 with θ →∞.
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Figure 10: Parameter Configuration for Symmetry Breaking under FMG: Setting F
The right panel of figure 10 is almost identical as figure 5 of Matsuyama (2004) except
for the boundary between region AB and A. By definition, the mass of entrepreneurs
cannot exceed the total mass of population in each generation, τ it ≤ 1. Taking that into
account, the boundary between region AB and A is characterized by a piecewise function
with two subfunctions.17 This result is confirmed in the generalized model with σ = 1 in
section 4. Thus, there is a technical error in figure 5 of Matsuyama (2004).
The solid (dash) curves in figure 11 show the laws of motion for wage under FMG
(IFA) in setting F, with the parameter configuration in the five regions of figure 10,
respectively. The analysis follows that in section 4.
As shown in the proof of proposition 4, the law of motion for wage under FMG consists
of the convex part for wit ∈ (0, w¯F ) and the flat part for wit > w¯F .18 Thus, in the case
of symmetry breaking, if the country ends up in the stable steady state with the higher
(lower) income level, the borrowing constraints must be slack (binding). For example, as
shown in the upper-left panel of figure 11, the law of motion for wage in case B is flat at
point H and upward-sloping at point L, where wH > wL.
To sum up, the model with the FIR in Matsuyama (2004) can be regarded as the
limiting case of the generalized model with σ = 1 and θ →∞.
17See the proof of proposition 4 for the analytical characterization of the two subfunctions.
18One can prove that, if wit is in the flat part, the borrowing constraints are slack; otherwise, the
borrowing constraints are binding.
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Figure 11: Phase Diagrams of Wage under FMG versus under IFA: Setting F
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. According to equation (16), the law of motion for wage is log-linear, lnwt+1 =
α lnwt + α ln
R
ρ
, with a slope less than unity, α < 1. Thus, there exists a unique and
stable steady state.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The proof consists of two steps.
Step 1: solution to the interest rate with the binding borrowing constraints
Combine equations (1)-(2) to get the factor price equation,
qαt w
1−α
t = 1. (36)
Rewrite equation (6) as rt =
λ
1−ψt qt+1R. Combine it with equations (16) and (36) to get
equation (17).
According to the credit market clearing equation,
Dt = wt(
1
ψt
− 1)[1− −(1+θ)t ], St = wt−(1+θ)t , Dt = St, ⇒ 1− −(1+θ)t = ψt. (37)
Combine equations (9) and (37) to get equation (18).
Thus, one can use equations (17)-(18) to solve ψt and rt as the functions of wt.
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Step 2: condition for the binding borrowing constraints
Use equation (17) to rewrite the condition for the binding borrowing constraints from
rt ≤ qt+1R into ψt ≤ 1− λ.
Combine wt = (1− α)Yt with equation (18) to get ψt as a function of Yt,
σ lnYt = lnψt − 1
1 + θ
ln(1− ψt) + lnm+ ln θ
(θ + 1)(1− α) , (38)
∂ lnψt
∂ lnm
=
−1
1 + 1
1+θ
ψt
1−ψt
< 0,
∂ lnψt
∂ lnYt
=
σ
1 + 1
1+θ
ψt
1−ψt
, ⇒ sgn
(
∂ψt
∂Yt
)
= sgn(σ). (39)
In the boundary case where the borrowing constraints are weakly binding with ψt = 1−λ,
equation (38) can be rewritten as m = (Yt)
σΛ.
Taking into account equations (39), for σ = 0 and σ = 1, the condition for the binding
borrowing constraints ψt < 1 − λ can be restated as m > (Yt)σΛ and the condition for
the slack borrowing constraints ψt > 1− λ can be restated as m < (Yt)σΛ.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. If ψt ∈ (1− λ, 1), the borrowing constraints are slack and, according to equation
(20), ∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
= −(1− α) < 0.
If ψt ∈ (0, 1− λ), the borrowing constraints are binding. Rewrite equation (17) as
ln rt = −(1− α) lnwt − ln(1− ψt) + lnλRαρ1−α, (40)
⇒ ∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
= − (1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
neoclassical effect
+
σ
1
ψt
− θ
1+θ
.︸ ︷︷ ︸
supply-side extensive-margin effect
(41)
For σ = 0, ∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
= α− 1 < 0.
For σ = 1, ∂ψt
∂Yt
> 0, according to equation (39). Let ψ˜A ≡ 12−α
1−α− 11+θ
. According to
equation (41), for ψt ∈ (0, ψ˜A), ∂ ln rt∂ lnwt < 0; for ψt ∈ (ψ˜A, 1− λ), ∂ ln rt∂ lnwt > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The proof consists of three steps. For simplicity, we suppress the country index i.
Step 1: derive the model solutions (9), (27)-(28) under FMG
For wt ∈ (0, w¯F ), ψt ∈ (0, 1− λ) and the borrowing constraints are binding. Combine
equations (8) and (12) to get Kt+1 = RMt = R
1−−(1+θ)t
ψt
wt. Combine it with equations
(1)-(2) to get the law of motion for wage (27). Combine equations (6), (36) and rt = r
∗
to get equation (28). Equation (9) defines the cutoff value t. Thus, given wt, one can
use equations (9), (27)-(28) to solve {ψt, t, wt+1} simultaneously.
Step 2: the shape of the law of motion for wage under FMG
Under FMG, the law of motion for wage is piecewise. Let µt+1 ≡ rtqt+1R denote the
rate-of-return wedge. Given rt = r
∗ under FMG, for wt > w¯F , the borrowing constraints
are slack, µt+1 = 1, and the law of motion for wage is flat at wt+1 = w¯t+1 ≡
(
R
r∗
)ρ
; for
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wt ∈ (0, w¯F ), the borrowing constraints are binding and the law of motion for wage is
implicitly defined by {wt, ψt, t, µt+1} satisfying equations (42),
µt+1 =
λ
1− ψt , w
− 1
ρ
t+1Rµt+1 = rt = r
∗, wσt = ψttF,
wt+1
wt
=
1− −(1+θ)t
ψtµt+1
r∗
ρ
, (42)
∂µt+1
∂ψt
=
λ
(1− ψt)2 > 0,
∂ψt
∂wt
=
S+ σ(1− S)
G+ 1
ψt
wt
> 0, (43)
where S ≡ 1−−(1+θ)t
1+θ
−(1+θ)
t
and G ≡ (1 + ρ) ψt
1−ψtS. The positive mass of entrepreneurs τt =
1− −θt > 0 gives t > 1 and hence, S ∈ (0, 1). Given ∂ψt∂wt > 0, for wt → 0, ψt → 0 so that
µt+1 → λ and wt+1 → wt+1 ≡
(
Rλ
r∗
)ρ
. Thus, the law of motion for wage has a positive
intercept on the vertical axis at wt+1. Let Z ≡ 1− ψt − S1−S − (1 + ρ)θψtS2.
J ≡ ∂wt+1
∂wt
=
ρ[S+ σ(1− S)]
G+ 1
ψt
1− ψt
wt+1
wt
> 0, if σ ≥ 0; (44)
for σ = 0, H ≡ ∂
2wt+1
∂w2t
= −
[
1− S
GS
(2 + θS) +
ρ+G
G
ψt
1− ψt
]
S
G+ 1
J
wt
< 0; (45)
for σ = 1, H ≡ ∂
2wt+1
∂w2t
= Z
1− S
G+ 1
1 + ρ
ρ
1
1− ψt
J
2
wt+1
⇒ sgn (H) = sgn(Z). (46)
In the case of σ = 0, the law of motion for wage is piecewise with a positive intercept
on the vertical axis at wt+1, concave for wt ∈ (0, w¯F ], and flat at w¯t+1 for wt > w¯F .
In the case of σ = 1,
∂Z
∂wt
= −
{
[1 + (1 + ρ)θS2t ]ψt
(G+ 1)wt
+
(1− S)(1 + θS)G
(G+ 1)wt
[
1
(1− S)2 + 2θ(1− ψ
i
t)G
]}
< 0.
Given ∂ψt
∂wt
> 0, for wt → 0, ψt → 0, so that Z > 0 and the law of motion for wage is
convex. Since ∂Z
∂wt
< 0, it is possible that, for wt → w¯F , ψt → 1 − λ so that Z < 0 and
the law of motion for wage becomes concave. Let wˇt define the threshold value such that
Z = 0, i.e., the inflection point of the law of motion for wage. There are two cases.
• Case 1: if wˇt > w¯F , the law of motion for wage is piecewise with a positive intercept
on the vertical axis at wt+1, convex for wt ∈ (0, w¯), and flat at w¯t+1 for wt > w¯F .
• Case 2: if wˇt < w¯F , the law of motion for wage is piecewise with a positive intercept
on the vertical axis at wt+1, convex for wt ∈ (0, wˇ), concave for wt ∈ (wˇ, w¯F ), and
flat at w¯t+1 for wt > w¯F .
Step 3: the threshold values for multiple steady states under FMG
For σ = 0, the law of motion for wage under FMG has a concave-flat shape so that
there exists a unique, stable steady state. See figure 5.
For σ = 1, the law of motion for wage under FMG has a convex-flat or convex-concave-
flat shape so that multiple steady states may arise, as shown in figure 7. Given σ = 1
and r∗ = rA, we derive as follows the threshold values for the five regions of figure 6.
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Case 1: consider the upper-right triangle of figure 6 where the borrowing constraints
are slack at the autarkic steady state with rA = ρ. Given r
∗ = rA = ρ, the law of motion
for wage at the autarkic steady state (S) is flat so that the autarkic steady state is still
stable under FMG. Compare the upper-right and the lower-right panels of figure 7. The
boundary between region BC and C of figure 6 is defined as the case where the law of
motion is tangent with the 45◦ line at point M, i.e., wit+1 = w
i
t = wM < wA, rM = r
∗ = ρ,
and JM ≡ ∂wt+1∂wt ‖wM = 1. Let DM ≡ 1−
−(1+θ)
M and N ≡ λ. Combine the three conditions
with equations (27)-(28) to get
wM < wA, ⇒ ψMM
ψAA
=
wM
wA
=
(
λ
1− ψM
)ρ
and ψM < ψA, (47)
rM =
λ
1− ψM
ψMρ
1− M
= ρ, ⇒ DM = NψM
1− ψM < ψM , (48)
JM =
ρ
(1 + ρ)SM +
1−ψM
ψM
= 1, ⇒ 1− 1
ψM(ρ+ 1)
= SM =
DM
1 + θ(1−DM) . (49)
Combine equations (48) and (49) to get[
1 +
1
ρ(θ + 1)
]
D
2
M −
[
N
ρ(1 + 1
θ
)
+ 1
]
DM +
N
ρ
= 0. (50)
DM is a root of equation (50).
19 Combine the solution to DM with equation (48) to solve
for ψM and M = (1 −DM)−
1
1+θ . Plug them and A = (1 − ψA)−
1
1+θ in equation (47) to
solve ψA as a function of λ, which defines the boundary between region BC and C.
Let us consider the limiting case of θ →∞. Equation (50) has two roots, i.e., DM = 1
and DM =
λ
ρ
. Combine DM = 1 with equation (48) to get ψM =
1
1+λ
< 1, which violates
the condition of DM < ψM < 1. Thus, the true solution should be Dt =
λ
ρ
. Combine
it with equation (48) to get ψM = 1 − α. Additionally, M = (1−DM)−
1
1+θ = 1 and
A = (1 − ψA)−
1
1+θ = 1. Inserting ψM , M , and A in equation (47) to get the boundary
condition for region BC and C in the limiting case of θ →∞,
ψA = (1− α)
(α
λ
)ρ
, and λ < α. (51)
Case 2: consider the lower-left triangle of figure 6 where the borrowing constraints are
binding at the autarkic steady state with ψA ∈ (0, 1−λ), µA ∈ (λ, 1), and rA = ρµA < ρ.
As shown in the upper-left panel of figure 7, given rt = r
∗ = rA under FMG, case B arises
if JA ≡ ∂wt+1∂wt ‖wA > 1. The solution is
ψA ∈ (ψˆ−F , ψˆ+F ), and ψA ∈ (0, 1− λ),
where ψˆ−F =
(
2− α− 1−α
1+θ
)−√(2− α− 1−α
1+θ
)2 − 4(1− α)
2
,
ψˆ+F =
(
2− α− 1−α
1+θ
)
+
√
(2− α− 1−α
1+θ
)2 − 4(1− α)
2
,
19According to equation (50), there are two roots for Dt. However, only one root satisfies the condition
of DM < ψM < ψA.
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which defines the border of region B in figure 6.
Let us consider the limiting case of θ →∞. The solution is
ψA ∈ (1− α, 1) and ψA ∈ (0, 1− λ). (52)
Case 3: consider the region with ψA < ψˆ
−
F in figure 6. Since JA < 1, the autarkic
steady state is still stable under FMG. Compare the upper-middle and the lower-left
panel of figure 7. As proved above, the law of motion for wage can be either convex or
convex-concave for wt ∈ (0, w¯F ). Taking that into account, FMG may lead to multiple
steady states in two subcases.
• Case 3.1: multiple steady states arise if the kink point of the law of motion for wage
is on or above the 45◦ line. Given r∗ = rA = ρµA, the kink point is characterized
by wt = w¯F , wt+1 = w¯t+1 ≡
(
R
r∗
)ρ
, ψt = ψK ≡ 1 − λ, µt+1 = µK = 1. As the
boundary case, the kink point is on the 45◦ line, i.e., w¯t+1 = w¯F . Combine them
with equations (42) to get,
w¯
1
ρ
t+1 =
R
r∗
=
R
ρµA
, w¯F = FψKK = F(1− λ)K (53)
r∗
ρ
1− −(1+θ)K
µKψK
=
w¯t+1
w¯F
= 1 ⇒ K =
(
µA
µA − 1 + λ
) 1
1+θ
(54)(
R
ρµA
)ρ
= w¯t+1 = w¯F = F(1− λ)K (55)(
R
ρ
)ρ
= wA = FψAA, A =
(µA
λ
) 1
1+θ
, µA =
λ
1− ψA (56)
⇒ (1− λ)λρ =
(
1
1− ψA −
1− λ
λ
) 1
1+θ
ψA(1− ψA)ρ. (57)
Let ψ˜F,1 denote the solution to equation (57), which is a function of λ.
Let us consider the limiting case of θ →∞. Equation (57) becomes
(1− λ)λρ = ψA(1− ψA)ρ. (58)
• Case 3.2: Multiple steady states arise if the concave part of the law of motion is
at least tangent with the 45◦ line at point M, i.e., wt+1 = wt = wM ∈ (wA, w¯F ),
JM ≡ ∂wt+1∂wt ‖wM = 1, and r∗ = rA = ρµA.20 Let DM ≡ 1− 
−(1+θ)
M and N ≡ 1− ψA.
Combine the three conditions with equations (27)-(28) to get
wM ∈ (wA, w¯F ), ⇒ ψMM
ψAA
=
wM
wA
=
(
µM
µA
)ρ
=
(
1− ψA
1− ψM
)ρ
, (59)
rM = r
∗ = ρµA, ⇒ DM = NψM
1− ψM > ψM , (60)
JM = 1, ⇒ 1− 1
ψM(ρ+ 1)
= SM =
DM
1 + θ(1−DM) . (61)
20The analysis is same as that for the boundary condition of region BC and C, except for rA = ρµA.
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Combine equations (60) and (61) to get[
1 +
1
ρ(θ + 1)
]
D
2
M −
[
N
ρ(1 + 1
θ
)
+ 1
]
DM +
N
ρ
= 0. (62)
DM is a root of equation (62).
21 Combine it with equation (60) to solve for ψM and
M = (1 − DM)−
1
1+θ . Plug them and A = (1− ψA)−
1
1+θ in equation (59) and let
ψ˜F,2 denote the solution, which is independent of λ.
Let us consider the limiting case of θ →∞. Equation (62) has two roots, i.e., DM =
1 and DM =
1−ψA
ρ
. Combine DM =
1−ψA
ρ
with equation (60) to get ψM = 1 − α
and plug it back in equation (59) to get ψA = 1 − α, which violates the condition
of ψA < ψM . Thus, the true solution should be DM = 1. Combine it with equation
(60) to get ψM =
1
2−ψA . Additionally, limθ→∞ M = limθ→∞ (1−DM)
− 1
1+θ = 1 and
limθ→∞ A = limθ→∞(1 − ψA)−
1
1+θ = 1. Inserting ψM , M , and A in equation (59)
to get the boundary condition for region AB and A
ψ1−αA (2− ψA) = 1. (63)
The boundary between region AB and A is characterized by ψ˜F = max{ψ˜F,1, ψ˜F,2}.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Under IFA, the law of motion for wage in setting N is identical as that in the
generalized model and so is that in setting F except for a kink at wt = m. Thus, the
proof follows exactly the proofs for proposition 1 and lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. In setting N, if τ ∈ (1− λ, 1), the borrowing constraints are slack with ψt = τ ∈
(1 − λ, 1) and, according to equation (20), ∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
= −(1 − α) < 0; if τ ∈ (0, 1 − λ], the
borrowing constraints are binding with ψt = τ ∈ (0, 1 − λ) and, according to equation
(33),
∂ ln rit
∂ lnwit
= −(1− α) < 0.
In setting N, if ψt ∈ (1− λ, 1), the borrowing constraints are slack and, according to
equation (20), ∂ ln rt
∂ lnwt
= −(1 − α) < 0. If ψt ∈ (0, 1 − λ), the borrowing constraints are
binding ψt =
wt
m
∈ (0, 1− λ). Define ψ˜A ≡ 1−α2−α . Rewrite equation (34)
ln rit = −(1− α) lnwit − ln(1− ψt) + lnλRαρ1−α. (64)
⇒ ∂ ln r
i
t
∂ lnwit
= −(1− α) + ψt
1− ψt , and
∂ ln rit
∂ lnwit
< 0, iff ψt ∈ (0, ψ˜A);> 0, iff ψt ∈ (ψ˜A, 1− λ). (65)
Proof of Proposition 4
21According to equation (62), there are two roots for Dt. However, only one root satisfies the condition
of DM > ψM .
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Proof. Steady-State Property under FMG in Setting N
In setting N, if the borrowing constraints are binding under FMG, combine equations
(1)-(3) with rit = r
∗ to get the law of motion for wage,
r∗(mit − wit) = λqit+1Rmit ⇒ r∗
[ ρ
R
(wit+1)
1
α − τwit
]
= λρwit+1, (66)
∂wit+1
∂wit
=
τ
ρ
[
(wit+1)
1
ρ
αR
− λ
r∗
]−1
=
τqit+1R
1 +
ρwit
mit
> 0, (67)
∂2wit+1
∂(wit)
2
= −
(
∂wit+1
∂wit
)3
(wit+1)
1
ρ
−1
ταR
< 0. (68)
Equation (66) implies that, for wit → 0, the law of motion for wage has a positive intercept
on the vertical axis at wit+1 =
(
Rλ
r∗
)ρ
. Define a threshold value w¯F =
ρ
r∗
1−λ
τ
( R
r∗ )
ρ. For
wit ∈ (0, w¯F ), the borrowing constraints are binding and the law of motion for wage is
increasing and concave, according to equations (67)-(68). For wit > w¯F , aggregate saving
and investment are so high that the marginal rate of return to investment is equal to the
world interest rate, Rqit+1 = r
∗ and the borrowing constraints are slack. In this case, any
further increase in wit leads to financial capital outflows, without affecting the domestic
investment. The law of motion for wage is then flat at w¯it+1 = (
R
r∗ )
ρ.
If τ ∈ (0, 1−λ), the borrowing constraints are slack in the autarkic steady state with
rA =
λ
1−τ ρ < ρ, implying that w¯
i
t+1 < w¯F . Thus, the kink point of the law of motion
for wage is below the 45◦ line. Graphically, the law of motion for wage crosses the 45◦
line once and only once from the left, with the intersection point in its concave part,
qualitatively the same as the left panel of figure 5.
If τ > 1 − λ, the borrowing constraints are slack in the autarkic steady state with
rA = ρ, implying that w¯
i
t+1 > w¯F . Thus, the kink point of the phase diagram is above
the 45◦ line. Graphically, the law of motion for wage crosses the 45◦ line once and only
once from the left, with the intersection point in its flat part, qualitatively the same as
the right panel of figure 5.
To sum up, given r∗ = rA, the autarkic steady state is still the unique, stable steady
state under FMG in setting N.
Steady-State Property under FMG in Setting F
In setting F, we first analyze the shape of the law of motion for wage and then describe
the conditions for symmetry breaking.
If the borrowing constraints are binding, Rqit+1 > r
∗ or equivalently ψit < 1 − λ.
Combine equations (1)-(3) with rit = r
∗ to get the law of motion for wage,
1− w
i
t
m
= λ
qit+1R
r∗
=
λρ
r∗
(
wA
wit+1
) 1
ρ
, (69)
J ≡ ∂w
i
t+1
∂wit
=
ρ
1
ψit
− 1
wit+1
wit
> 0, and H ≡ ∂
2wit+1
∂(wit)
2
= J2
1
αwit+1w
i
t
> 0. (70)
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Combine equation (69) with (1)-(2) and then compute the mass of entrepreneurs,
wit+1 = wA
[
λρ
r∗(1− ψit)
]ρ
⇒ τ it =
Kit+1
Rm
=
ρ(wit+1)
1
α
Rm
= ψA
[
λρ
r∗(1− ψit)
] 1
1−α
. (71)
The mass of entrepreneurs is bounded by the population size in each generation, τ it ≤ 1.
According to equation (71), for wit → 0, ψit → 0 and the law of motion for wage has
a positive intercept on the vertical axis at wit+1 = wA
(
λρ
r∗
)ρ
. Similar as in setting N,
the law of motion for wage in setting F under FMG consists of two subfunctions. The
kink point depends on two factors, i.e., whether the borrowing constraints are binding
or slack, and whether the mass of entrepreneurs is below or equal to unity. For ψA ∈
(0, 1− λ], the borrowing constraints are binding in the autarkic steady state and, under
FMG, r∗ = λρ
1−ψA < ρ. In this case, according to equation (71), τ
i
t ≤ 1 implies that
ψit ≤ ψˇF ≡ 1− ψ1−αA (1− ψA). For ψA ∈ [1− λ, 1], the borrowing constraints are slack in
the autarkic steady state and, under FMG, r∗ = ρ. In this case, according to equation
(71), τ it ≤ 1 implies that ψit ≤ 1− λψ1−αA .
In the following, I characterize the shape of the law of motion for wage in two cases:
• Case 1: if ψˇF > 1− λ,
For ψit ∈ (0, 1− λ), the borrowing constraints are binding, some agents become en-
trepreneurs, τ it < 1, and the law of motion for wage is convex, w
i
t+1 = wA
(
1−ψA
1−w
i
t
m
)ρ
;
for ψit > 1 − λ, the borrowing constraints are slack, some agents become en-
trepreneurs, τ it < 1, and the law of motion for wage is flat at w
i
t+1 = wA
(
1−ψA
λ
)ρ
.
• Case 2: if ψˇF < 1− λ,
For ψit ∈ (0, ψˇF ), the borrowing constraints are binding, some agents become en-
trepreneurs, τ it < 1, and the law of motion for wage is convex, w
i
t+1 = wA
(
1−ψA
1−w
i
t
m
)ρ
;
for ψit > ψˇF , the borrowing constraints are binding, all agents become entrepreneurs,
τ it = 1, and the law of motion for wage is flat at w
i
t+1 =
(
Rm
ρ
)α
= wA
ψαA
.
The convex part of the phase diagram creates the possibility of multiple steady states.
Figure 10 shows the parameter configuration of five regions in the {λ, ψA} space and in
the {λ, Z} space, respectively. Figure 11 shows the laws of motion for wage under FMG
versus under IFA in five cases.
In the following, I derive the boundary conditions for the five regions in figure 10.
Case 1: Consider the upper-right triangle of figure 10, i.e., ψA ∈ (1−λ, 1). Compare
the upper-right and the lower-right panels of figure 11. Given r∗ = rA = ρ, the law of
motion for wage under FMG is flat at the initial steady state (point S); the boundary
between region BC and C is defined as the case where the convex part of the law of
motion for wage is tangent with the 45◦ line at point M, i.e., wit = w
i
t+1 = wM < wA and
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JM = 1. Rewrite equations (69) and (70) at the tangent point,
1− wM
m
= λw
− 1
ρ
M
R
ρ
, ⇒
(
1− wM
m
)(wM
m
) 1
ρ
= ψ
1
ρ
Aλ
JM =
ρψM
1− ψM =
ρρ
λRm
(wM)
1
α = 1, ⇒
(wM
m
) 1
α
=
λ
ρ
ψ
1
ρ
A.
Combine them to get
wM
m
= 1− α and ψA = (1− α)
(α
λ
)ρ
, (72)
wM < wA ⇒ wF
m
< ψA and λ < α. (73)
Equations (72)-(73) jointly define the boundary between region BC and C, the same as
equations (51) in the limiting case of the generalized model with σ = 1 and θ →∞.
Case 2: Consider the lower-left triangular of figure 10, i.e., ψA ∈ (0, 1 − λ). Given
rt = r
∗ = rA under FMG, case B arises if the law of motion for wage under FMG has a
slope exceeds unity at the autarkic steady state, JA =
ρ
1
ψA
−1 > 1. The solution is
ψA ∈ (1− α, 1) and ψA ∈ (0, 1− λ) (74)
which specifies the boundary between region B and AB, the same as equations (52) in
the limiting case of the generalized model with σ = 1 and θ →∞.
Case 3: consider the region with ψA < ψˆF . Since JA < 1, the autarkic steady state
is stable under FMG. Compare the upper-middle and the lower-left panel of figure 11.
FMG may still generate multiple steady states if the kink point of the law of motion for
wage is above the 45◦ line, i.e., w¯t+1 > w¯F . There are two subcases.
• Case 3.1: if ψˇF > 1−λ, the kink point is at w¯F = (1−λ)m and w¯t+1 = wA
(
1−ψA
λ
)ρ
.
In the boundary case,
w¯t+1 = w¯F , ⇔ (1− ψA)ρψA = (1− λ)λρ, (75)
which is the same as equations (58) in the limiting case of the generalized model
with σ = 1 and θ →∞.
Let ψ˜F,1 denote the solution to equation (75).
• Case 3.2: if ψˇF < 1 − λ, the kink point is at w¯Ft = [1 − (1 − ψA)ψ1−αA ]m and
w¯t+1 =
wA
ψαA
. In the boundary case,
w¯t+1 = w¯F , ⇔ ψ1−αA (2− ψA) = 1, (76)
which is the same as equations (63) in the limiting case of the generalized model
with σ = 1 and θ →∞
Let ψ˜F,2 denote the solution to equation (76).
The boundary between region AB and A is characterized by ψ˜F = max{ψ˜F,1, ψ˜F,2}.
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